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God and Human Freedom, by Leigh Vicens and Simon Kittle. Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. Pp. 73. $18 (paperback).
PETER FURLONG, Valencia College
In this excellent book, Vicens and Kittle lead the reader on a quick tour 
of some of the central philosophical issues concerning the relationship 
between God and human freedom. The volume takes up two central top-
ics, divine foreknowledge and divine providence, examining both insofar 
as they relate to human freedom. In both cases, there at least seem to be 
troubling tensions between the divine activity on the one hand and the 
free will of creatures on the other.
As might be expected from an introductory text, the aim of the volume 
is not to argue for a single solution or set of solutions to the difficulties 
considered. The authors make this point explicitly in the section dealing 
with divine providence: “Our aim in this section is not to defend any par-
ticular view of providence wholesale, but to point out certain “costs and 
benefits” of each” (32). The same point seems to apply to the section on 
divine foreknowledge, even if this is not as explicitly stated.
Nevertheless, this book is not a dry, detached overview of the work 
of others. First, the authors are more than happy to weigh into debates 
in new and interesting ways with the goal of discussing these costs and 
benefits. Obviously, readers might see the terrain of costs and benefits 
differently, but I  think that the approach taken makes the text far more 
engaging than it would have been if the authors attempted to remain as 
mere reporters on philosophical discussions. Second, although the authors 
refrain from endorsing any single solution to the problems discussed, they 
have no qualms about rejecting some of those they consider. Indeed, each 
of the two major sections features such a rejection, both of which will be 
discussed below.
Before moving onto an overview of the content of the work, it is worth 
dwelling for a moment on a question of audience: Who should read this 
text? As an introductory text, its intended audience is likely to be, at least 
primarily, students. I  think this work would be extremely valuable for 
assignments in courses focused either on philosophy of religion or free 
will. Although some aspects of the book are likely too complicated for 
many undergraduates left to their own devices, when paired with in-class 
guidance, I think students will find it very approachable.
I don’t think the value of this book ends with its service for undergrad-
uates, though. Graduate students and professors with little background 
in this area of philosophy of religion will find an engaging and quick 
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overview of the major positions and argumentative moves relevant to the 
book’s topic. For those eager for more, the bibliography is extensive for a 
work of this type, making further investigation easy. I have not read any 
of the other volumes in the Cambridge Elements series, but after reading 
this one, I am eager to search for some in areas far outside of my research 
areas, with the hope that they will be as rewarding as this one.
I turn, now, to an overview of the work. As I mentioned, the volume 
is split, roughly evenly, between the topics of divine foreknowledge 
and divine providence, in both cases focusing on those issues relevant 
to human freedom. In section 1, the authors organize the topic around a 
particular argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and 
human freedom. For those thinking about using this work for a course 
text, it is worth noting that the argument, as presented, might scare some 
beginner undergraduates. First, readers are introduced to the N operator: 
“NS t(p) is short for p and S has, at and after t, no choice about the fact that 
p” (6). With this explained, they move on to the formal presentation of the 
argument:
(1) God believed at time t1 that Jones would decide at t3 to mow her lawn.
(2) NJones t2(God believed at t1 that Jones would decide at t3 to mow her lawn).
(3) If NS t(p) and N
S t(p entails q), then N
S t(q).
(4)  NJones t2(God believed at t1 that Jones would decide at t3 to mow her lawn 
entails that Jones will decide at t3 to mow her lawn).
(5) NJones t2(Jones will decide at t3 to mow her lawn).
(6)  If NJones t2(Jones will decide at t3 to mow her lawn), then Jones cannot decide 
to refrain from mowing her lawn.
(7)  If Jones cannot decide to refrain from mowing her lawn, she does not at t3 
decide to mow her lawn freely.
(8) Therefore, Jones does not at t3 decide to mow her lawn freely (7).
While there is no getting around this argument—at least not without jet-
tisoning the entire section devoted to foreknowledge—I think instructors 
should not be fearful of using this even in relatively introductory courses. 
This is the most imposing part of the book, but the authors handle it well, 
guiding those readers unfamiliar with some of the philosophical conven-
tions utilized in this presentation. In fact, I think the structure of this section 
provides a wonderful opportunity to perfect students’s understanding of 
the structure of philosophical debate. This section of the book is focused 
on responses to this argument, and so positions are explained not merely 
in terms of some of their key characteristics, but also in terms of precisely 
how they handle this argument. This structure allows readers—especially 
students—to see clearly that the dialectical topology is not an amorphous 
blob of interesting ideas, but instead is tightly structured.
The heart of this section is a discussion of seven different ways of 
responding to the argument detailed above. Although I have a small quib-
ble about one of these presentations, overall the quality is excellent.
The first of these looks to what the authors call “alternative views of 
free will.” The argument noted above presupposes an account of free will 
392 Faith and Philosophy
in keeping with the truth of the principle of alternative possibilities. As the 
authors say “On this account of free will an agent, P, who faces a decision 
between A and B will decide freely only if (i) P is able to decide to A, and 
(ii) P is able to decide to B (where deciding to B might simply be deciding 
to refrain from A-ing)” (8). Here, I think the discussion might have been 
made a little clearer for the reader. According to the authors, “When an 
agent faces a choice or decision (we use the terms interchangeably), she 
has at least two options from among which she can select. Choice therefore 
entails the existence of what the contemporary literature calls alternative 
possibilities” (8). One way to respond to the argument above is to deny 
this account of free will, and the authors especially highlight what they 
call “non-choice-based accounts of free will” (8), discussing the views of 
Hobbes and Frankfurt. Their definition of choice/decision, together with 
their discussion of non-choice-based accounts, might give the impression 
that all those who reject the availability of alternative possibilities deny the 
existence of choices or decisions. Moreover, the sole contemporary view 
explored here is that of Frankfurt, who offers a view according to which 
freedom concerns “the alignment of a person”s “second-order” desires 
with her “first-order” desires” as the authors put it (8). In the end, though, 
Frankfurt comes to claim that the alignment of desires is insufficient for 
freedom; this view must be supplemented with a decision to identify with 
a desire. The authors contend that this reveals that decision—or choice—is 
central after all. The problem with this move is that those who reject PAP 
need not define choice/decision as the authors do, that is as requiring 
alternative possibilities.
My point is not that the authors misunderstand the dialectic on this 
point—I am sure they don’t—but instead that many readers, especially 
undergraduates, might have difficulty making sense of the relationship 
between choice/decision on the one hand and alternative possibilities on 
the other, especially when philosophers use the terms in different ways. 
Additionally, I think it would be especially helpful for the reader to have 
heard about at least one account according to which the control necessary 
for moral responsibility is both compatible with the absence of alterna-
tives and still centrally related to human decisions. A brief discussion of 
John Martin Fischer’s distinction between guidance and regulative con-
trol might have worked well in this regard (The Metaphysics of Free Will 
(Blackwell, 1994)).
After a brief look at how one might deny the transfer principle artic-
ulated in premise 3, the authors turn their attention to Ockhamism. The 
authors take the reader through the history of this account, focusing most 
on the developments of this view from the 1960s to the 1990s. The dis-
cussion of these developments is both thorough and insightful, especially 
given the brevity required of them. My only wish is that they would have 
found space to explain in a little more depth the recent discussion that has 
arisen over the distinction between soft and hard facts on the one hand 
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and metaphysical dependence on the other. Unhappily, some things must 
be cut in the interests of space, I suppose.
The authors then canvas other responses to the main argument, includ-
ing rejecting the fixity of the past, claiming that God, not existing in time, 
does not believe things at times, and endorsing open theism. While each of 
these discussions provides an excellent introduction to their respective top-
ics, I wish to move past them to focus on the section on Molinism. Here the 
authorial voice comes out more strongly than in discussions of other replies 
to the foreknowledge argument. Concerning whether middle knowledge 
solves the difficulty of reconciling divine foreknowledge and human free-
dom, the authors confidently assert, “We think not” (30). Moreover, they 
suggest that it might even make matters worse: “Foreknowledge suggests 
that human decisions in the realm of the future are fixed or settled; middle 
knowledge suggests that human decisions in the realm of the merely pos-
sible are fixed or settled. Anyone who deems the former issue a problem 
worth addressing should, we think, also deem the latter a problem worth 
addressing” (31). Moreover, they note that many prominent Molinists 
link their views to one of the other solutions on offer. They conclude “The 
key point is that these replies are independent of Molinism: each can be 
advocated without endorsing Molinism, and Molinism adds nothing to 
them” (31). Whether one agrees or not, I think that the authors” decision to 
include some of their own judgments adds interest and dynamism to the 
book, and, moreover, some research suggests that “engaging the debate” 
rather than remaining neutral aids students in avoiding skepticism about 
philosophical problems (Brian Besong, “Teaching the Debate,” Teaching 
Philosophy 39 (2016): 401–412). I think, then, that such additions should be 
welcomed by both philosophers and students.
I turn now to the second section of the book, which deals with divine 
providence. In this section, the authors investigate a number of different 
accounts of providence, each of which, according to its adherents, pre-
serves human moral responsibility (Pereboom-style hard theological 
determinism is mentioned, but not explored at great length). They begin 
by looking at a view according to which human free will is compatible 
with theological determinism, but not natural determinism, and conclude 
the section by looking at a more thoroughgoing compatibilism, according 
to which freedom is compatible with determinism of both varieties. In 
between discussion of these two views, they also look at Molinism and 
open theism, and provide an excellent discussion of free will responses to 
the problem of evil as these relate to the issue of selecting an account of 
providence.
Here I will focus on their discussions of the more restricted variety of 
compatibilism and Molinism, because here we find the authorial voice 
coming out especially strongly. According to the restricted variety of 
compatibilism, remember, human freedom is compatible with theolog-
ical determinism but not natural determinism. (Here I  note one small 
disagreement with the authors: In my view, the views of Brian Shanley 
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and W.  Matthews Grant are not best categorized in this camp.) While 
the authors admit that this view is not incoherent, the important ques-
tion is whether it is plausible. At the outset, they reveal their view: “[T]
he answer to this seems to be a straightforward no” (34). In defending 
this response, they note that three purported differences between the two 
sorts of determinism fail to establish any difference relevant to the issue of 
compatibility with freedom. First, although God causes our existence and 
our action simultaneously, this does not seem to give us any reason for 
thinking our freedom remains intact. Second, although God does not con-
stitute a determining condition that predates our action (since God does 
not exist in time at all), the authors provide an intriguing argument that 
incompatibilists ought to worry just as much about simultaneous deter-
mining causes. Although God is not strictly simultaneous to us either, 
their argument is meant to show that temporal priority does not play the 
important role that is sometimes thought. Finally, the claim that natural 
causes are problematic merely because they are event causes carries no 
weight according to the authors. Many ordinary incompatibilists are thor-
oughgoing event-causalists anyway, and others maintain that free actions 
must be either uncaused or caused only by the agent herself. In either case, 
theological determinism would undermine the freedom sought.
When discussing Molinism, the authors introduce the grounding objec-
tion and offer extended consideration of whether Molinists might adopt 
a soul-making theodicy, but I think the most engaging aspect of their dis-
cussion centers on the issue of whether, given Molinism, God intends evil. 
According to the Molinist picture they consider, God absolutely intends 
that no agents sin, but God’s conditional intentions are broader. These 
intentions, which take into account the circumstances within which God 
finds himself—including what created agents would freely do in various 
circumstances—include everything which comes to pass. In this sense, 
then, God intends everything that occurs in the universe. For this account 
to get God off the hook for intending evil, absolute intentions must be 
those most connected with moral evaluation. The problem, the authors 
contend, is that absolute intentions are not intentions at all; they are 
desires. Moreover, the sort of conditional intentions the Molinist points to 
seem to be nothing other than perfectly ordinary intentions, that is, inten-
tions of how to act in the concrete contexts in which we find ourselves, 
rather than abstracted from all such considerations. It seems, then, that in 
the perfectly ordinary sense of “intend,” God intends sin, at least on the 
Molinist picture. Importantly, it is these ordinary intentions that we take 
to be morally significant. While the authors do not conclude that Molinism 
fails as an account of divine providence, their conclusion does suggest it is 
more costly than some Molinists think.
In the end, the authors succeed in producing a short, readable, wel-
comely opinionated introduction to their topic. I highly recommend this 
book to anyone interested in philosophy of religion or free will, as well as 
all those teaching in either of these areas.
